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Humility has been classified as a character strength and has been thought to bestow positive life 
outcomes. This research aimed to examine the effects of humility in response to failures. I 
hypothesized that humble individuals cope with failures in a non-defensive manner. Across three 
experiments, it has been demonstrated that after receiving negative feedback individuals induced 
to feel humble do not show over-activation of positive self-concepts neither do they displayed a 
diminished activation of negative self-concepts compared to the non-humbled individuals. That 
is, they would not deliberately magnify their merits nor diminish their weaknesses in order to 
cope with an ego-threat. How these findings reconcile with the nature of humility is discussed. 
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 Research on human character strengths and virtues include the study of humility. 
Humility has been classified as a character strength (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) and has 
been thought to bestow positive life outcomes (e.g., Emmons, 1999; Sandage, 1999; 
Sandage & Wiens, 2001; Worthington, 1998). Although the benefits of humility have 
been proposed by both psychologists and religious leaders alike, the study of humility 
and its effects on basic psychological effects still remain limited. In particular, questions 
remains regarding how humble people respond to failure that threatens the self (i.e., ego-
threat) because of the personal shortcoming it communicates. Research has found that the 
manner in which a person responds to failure has implications for subsequent adjustment 
and well-being. If humility is a character strengths that offers resources needed for 
effective coping, does it also enable a constructive response to ego-threats? In this 
research, I aim to fill a gap in humility research by examining the effects of humility in 
face of failures.   
Nature of Humility 
The study of humility can be traced back to the teachings of theology and 
philosophy, many of which expound the merits of being humble (e.g., Richards, 1992).  
Dictionary definitions tend to portray humility negatively and associate it with low self-
regard and unworthiness. For example, the Longman Dictionary defines humility as 
considering the self as less important than others whereas the Oxford English Dictionary 
defines humility as having a low view of one’s importance. Note that although these 
definitions are confined to the layperson’s perception, studies have found exceptions. For 
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example, in a study by Exline and Greyer (2004), the researchers found that American 
college students perceive humility as a psychological strength and do not equate humility 
with low self-esteem. 
Still the academias painted a more favorable picture and conceptualized humility 
much more accurately. In particular, humble individuals are said to have an assured sense 
of self-worth (Tangney, 2002; Exline & Greyer, 2004). Psychologists have posited that 
this assured sense of self-worth entails humble individuals knowing their strengths and 
limitations. This does not mean that humble people know themselves perfectly well.  
Rather, it implies that humble individuals are willing to see themselves accurately, to 
know both their strengths and weaknesses, and they would not deliberately magnify their 
merits nor diminish their weaknesses (Means, Wilson, Sturm, & Biron, 1990; Peterson & 
Seligman, 2004; Exline & Greyer, 2004).  
Consistent with their strong sense of self-worth, experts have proposed that 
humble individuals are able to acknowledge and accept their shortcomings (Sandage, 
1999; Emmons, 1999; Jennings et al., 2005). They are thought to be willing to 
acknowledge and accept information of the self even if they are negative, and would not 
reject or distort this negative information so as to protect their self-image (Tangney, 
2000). As noted by Yancey (2000), one reason why early Christian writers are often 
perceived as uniquely humble is their ability to acknowledge their mistakes and 
shortcomings. Consistently, Myers (1995, 2000) observed that humble people exhibit 
very little self-serving bias and tend not to take extra credit for their accomplishments. 
These observations reiterate that humble people are assured individuals who tend not to 
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magnify their strengths or ignore their weaknesses to feel better about themselves (Means 
et al., 1990; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Exline & Greyer, 2004).  
One need to note that humility is not the same as self-deprecation in which the 
self is disparaged, often for self-serving reasons (e.g., to lower expectations, to seek 
social approval). A study by Gibson (2007) demonstrated that individuals who self-
deprecate are not interested in having an accurate sense of self. Humility is also not 
modesty. A modest person behaves in a socially approved manner, such as not dressing in 
a flashy manner or not taking credit for a success, but may privately have a sense of 
superiority (Hineline, 1991; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). A humble person, on the other 
hand, behaves in accordance to his/her measured self-views and resists seeing 
himself/herself as more important than others.  
Humble individuals are also known to be not arrogant for these reasons. They are 
thought to be sensitive and responsive to the feelings of other people (Exline, Baumeister, 
Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004; Means et al., 1990; Rowatt et al., 2006; Tangney, 
2000). They respect the worth of each individual, and do not put people down (Means et 
al., 1990; Roberts, 1983; Worthington, 1998). In fact, studies have found that college 
students who are humble in their achievements are preferred by their fellow schoolmates 
(Hareli & Weiner, 2000; Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, 2007). The fact that humble people 
do not self-enhance or self-deprecate could also make them more likeable and respected 
in the eyes of others. 
Further, because humble people are not defensive about their weaknesses and 
have the desire to improve themselves, they are often thought to be open to correction 
(Tangney, 2002; Templeton, 1998). They are ready to change themselves or make 
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amendments for their mistakes (Davis, Worthington, & Hook, 2010; Exline et al., 2004; 
Means et al., 1990; Rowatt et al., 2006). Theorists have also noted a strong sense of 
spirituality/religiosity in humble people (Powers et al., 2007; Rowatt et al., 2006; 
Tangney, 2002). The strong religious beliefs that humble people are thought to hold 
might be a channel by which they learn about themselves, keep their achievements in 
perspective, acknowledge and improve upon on their weaknesses, and maintain a 
respectful and non-boastful approach in their relationships with others. All in all, humility 
can be thought as a dispositional character strength that brings about positive life 
outcome, whether directly or indirectly. 
To be accurate, research has yet to thoroughly validate which of the mentioned 
qualities of humility indeed constitute the nature of humility and which qualities are 
simply related to the disposition. This ambiguity is in part due to the lack of validated 
humility measures (which I will explain shortly). However, drawing from these scholastic 
conceptualizations as a starting point, I propose that a working definition of humility 
could involve the following attributes: (1) an assured self-worth; (2) tendency to keep 
one’s abilities and accomplishments in perspective; (3) willingness to acknowledge and 
accept one’s mistakes and imperfections; (4) lack of self-deprecating tendencies; (5) lack 
of self-enhancing tendencies; (6) willingness to improve on one’s weaknesses. One need 
to note that humility should be considered as a dynamic construct comprising these 
attributes, hence they may not be overlapping perfectly. 
Humility: A Dispositional Character Strength 
Many researchers have argued that one reason that humility is important is 
because it predicts positive life outcomes (e.g., Emmons, 1999; Peterson & Seligman, 
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2004; Sandage, 1999; Sandage & Wiens, 2001; Worthington, 1998). There is evidence to 
suggest that humble individuals are forgiving, compassionate, patient, and kind (Davis et 
al., 2010; Exline & Geyer, 2004; Means et al., 1990; Powers et al., 2007; Peters et al., 
2011; Rowatt et al., 2006; Sandage, 1999). For instance, in a study by Exline and 
colleagues (2000) it was found that people who were in a state of humility were slower to 
retaliate in response to provocation on a laboratory task. This implies that humility could 
positively impact interpersonal relationships. Further, the willingness to acknowledge and 
accept one’s mistakes and imperfections (considered to be one of the attributes of 
humility) may result in decreased justification of their actions. That is, they will not 
blindly defend themselves and/or their actions. While defense and justification of one’s 
actions will result in a perception of injustice, decreased justification will instead 
promotes the seeking and giving of forgiveness (Exline et al., 2004). People who forgive 
have even been shown to reap physiological benefits (Lawler et al., 2003; Lawler et al., 
2005).  
There are also studies which found a link between humility and good academic 
performance (Johnson, Rowatt, & Petrini, 2011; Rowatt et al., 2006). Though the 
causality of this correlation is unclear, it is consistent with proposals that humble 
individuals are open to novel ideas and have a strong desire to learn (Tangney, 2002; 
Templeton, 1998). Being open and having a strong desire to learn is also a desirable trait 
in the work setting (Reave, 2005). It is thus possible that humble people are well-liked 
and respected whether in school or work setting, and that people are therefore willing to 
assist them in times of need (Peters, Rowatt, & Johnson, 2011). Also, humble corporate 
leaders who are resilient were also found to generate more profits for the organization 
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(Collins, 2001), while humility in employees was found to predict high job performance 
(Johnson et al., 2011). Humility had also been shown to be beneficial in health and 
therapy settings (Kurtz & Ketcham, 1992; Fontana, Rosenberg, Burg, Kerns, & Colonese, 
1990). Though the causality of these findings is unclear, they could be tentative support 
for the idea that humility is a resource that enables effective adaptation to life’s 
challenges (Emmons, 1999; Exline & Geyer, 2004; Petersen & Seligman, 2004; Tangney, 
2002).  
Humility: Non-Defensive Response to Failure  
The literature suggests that humble individuals adapt well to life events, whether 
they involve mastering academic concepts, managing relationships, or handling work 
challenges. However, navigating such life events is not easy because of the intermittent 
failures one could encounter, and effective adaptation to challenges depends in part on 
how the person responds to failures. Of interest in the current research is how humility 
will influence the effect that failure could have on self-concepts. A body of research has 
shown that failure can be damaging to a person’s self-views and also their subsequent 
performance (Bronckner, 1979; Morrison, 1979; Nurius & Markus, 1990). Failure can 
signal inadequacies in the self and some people react by affirming their positive self-
views whereas other might respond by wallowing in self-pity (Neff, Hsieh, & Dejitterat, 
2005). If humility is associated with an assured sense of self-worth, what effect would 
failure have on the self-concepts of the humble? This research examined how self-
concepts are activated during a failure encounter as a function of humility.  
Failures, such as doing badly at a term paper or being rejected at an interview, are 
inevitable in life, but people react to them differently. To cope with the ego threat that 
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follows failures, one can self-enhance by inflating positive self-views, deflating negative 
self-view or both (Feick & Rhodewalt, 1997; Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Arkin, 1981). 
For example, a student who has obtained an undesired grade may try to discredit the 
negative feedback by deliberately attributing his or her failure to external factors (e.g., the 
room is too noisy for me to concentrate) rather accepting his or her weaknesses (Blaine & 
Crocker, 1993). The student might also try to undermine the failure by bringing to mind 
positive self-concepts (e.g., remembering that he is good in sport) and rejecting negative 
self-concepts (e.g., discounting the fact that he has been lazy; Baumeister & Jones, 1978; 
Steele, 1988).  Using these self-enhancing coping strategies, the student could disconfirm 
the unfavorable feedback received in the failure, maintain or even inflate her/her sense of 
self-worth, and deny personal weaknesses. 
Self-enhancing is a common strategy to cope with failures, for instance, Steel 
(1988) suggested that people may compensate for a failure experience by focusing on 
their strengths. In a study by Baumeister and Jones (1978), it was found that after 
receiving a negative feedback, participants gave themselves higher rating for self-
attributes that were unrelated to the failure. It was also found that favorability of self-
image increased when participants encountered a failure in public (Greenberg & 
Pyszczynski, 1986). This suggests that an overvaluation of self-image is a way to 
compensate for failures. Besides these empirical support, self-enhancing defenses have 
long been suggested by Adler (1956) who theorized that the strive for superiority is an 
attempt to compensate for any inferiority.  
However, there are grounds to propose that humble individuals are less likely to 
employ such self-enhancing strategies to cope with ego threats. As just reviewed, there 
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appears to be consensus among theorists that humility is associated with an assured sense 
of self-worth. Compared to the average person, humble people are more willing to accept 
their shortcomings and to keep their accomplishments in check. This could suggest that in 
the event of a failure, they have less compulsion to inflate their self-worth by magnifying 
positive self-information and rejecting negative self-information to disconfirm the 
undesirable failure feedback. This could stem not only from their secured sense of self-
worth but also from their willingness to accept their weaknesses and having an openness 
to correct themselves (Sandage, 1999; Tangney, 2002; Exline et al., 2004). Note also that 
humble individuals are aware of their strengths. These strengths can help them to buffer 
against failures in life. It is thus possible that during failures, humble individuals would 
draw on their strengths and would be less averse to the negative feedback about 
themselves, less likely to reject the negative self-information, and more likely to learn 
from the experience (Tangney, 2002; Means et al., 1990). 
Therefore, I predict that upon receiving negative feedback signifying failure, 
humble individuals are less likely than non-humble individuals to over-activate positive 
self-concepts and also less likely to de-activate negative self-concepts. This non-
defensive strategy, if true, could yield psychological dividends for humble people. 
Studies have found that people with inflated self-views are more socially maladaptive and 
less liked by their peers (Colvin, Black, & Funder, 1995; Robinson, Johnson, & Shields, 
1995). Further, research by Moore (2007) found that positive illusions correlated 
positively with depressive symptoms. Extremely positive self-views have also been 
linked to poorer self-esteem, well-being, and even academic performance (Compton, 
2001; Robins & Beer, 2001). Hence, an contribution that this research could make for 
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future research on humility is in showing how the non-defensive response to failures 
exhibited by humble individuals might facilitate coping with difficulties and excelling in 
academic, relationship, and work challenges (Johnson et al., 2011; Rowatt et al. 2006).  
Current Research and Methodological Considerations 
The current research examined differences in the type of the self-concept 
activated in response to a failure situation between humble and neutral (non-humble) 
people. To simulate a failure situation, some participants were asked to do an arithmetic 
task and were given feedback that they had done poorly. Other participants completed the 
same task but were not given any feedback. Self-concepts were then measured. Note that 
this research examined only global positive and negative self-concepts (good versus bad 
self-related information) and not domain-specific self-concepts (e.g., intelligence). 
Activation of global self-concepts was operationalized and measured differently in 
different studies. In Experiment 1, they were represented by the number of positive and 
negative traits of themselves participants can bring to mind. In Experiments 2 and 3, we 
employed a latency response task to measure accessibility of global positive and negative 
self-concepts. My over-arching prediction is that in the negative feedback condition, 
humble participants would exhibit weaker activation of negative self-concepts 
(Experiment 1: fewer negative traits listed; Experiments 2 and 3: weaker accessibility of 
negative self-concepts) as well as weaker activation of positive self-concepts (Experiment 
1: fewer positive traits listed; Experiments 2 and 3: weaker accessibility of positive self-
concepts) compared to neutral participants.  
This prediction could be tested by measuring humility and examining how self-
concepts varied with humility. However, there are formidable validity issues with 
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available measures of humility. Self-report humility scales are not suitable for several 
reasons (e.g., Ashton & Lee, 2005; 2007; 2008). Genuinely humble people would not 
report their humble qualities as they are less attentive to themselves (Tangney, 2000; 
Myers, 1995). Further, people could report themselves as highly humble, a desirable 
quality, due to self-serving motivations (Johnson & Robins, 1993; Asendorpf & 
Ostendorf, 1998). This critique should not be taken to imply that humble and non-humble 
individuals never provide accurate scores of their humility. Rather it is the 
acknowledgment that the current self-report measures are not able to provide an accurate, 
holistic and reliable measure of humility and that users of the self-report humility 
measures should be aware that such limitations. Further, an implicit association test (IAT) 
of humility has also been developed to circumvent concerns associated with self-report 
(Powers et al., 2007; Rowatt et al., 2006). 1995). However, this measure failed to 
correlate with humility peer ratings and other humility-related outcomes, raising concerns 
over its validity (Powers et al., 2007; Rowatt et al., 2006).   
Therefore, I manipulated humility and tested differences in activated self-concepts 
between humility and neutral conditions. However, past studies have not attempted to 
manipulate humility. Humility could be manipulated by staging realistic situations or 
having participants imagine themselves in suitable vignettes or videos. However, the 
same situation or imagery material might not generate the intended response in all 
participants; e.g., participants may feel low self-esteem instead of humility (Harmon-
Jones, Peterson, & Vaughn, 2003). Implicit methods (e.g., subliminal priming) could be 
used, but they tend to activate implicit representations, not necessarily conscious 
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experiences (Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005; Yang & Tong, 2010), and my 
aim was to examine conscious humility experiences. 
The recall method was used, in which, before the failure simulation, participants 
(in all three studies) were asked to recall an incident where they felt humble. Specific 
definitions of humility were given to the participants such that they would not confuse 
humility with low self-regard and humiliation. One other humility study by Exline and 
Geyer (2004) also had participants recall humble experiences, although not for the 
purpose of inducing humility. Recall is an effective method for inducing psychological 
states (Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994). There are concerns of memory 
degradation with the recall method, but it avoids or minimizes the problems of other 
induction techniques. Participants in the neutral condition were asked to indicate the 
landmarks they encountered while commuting to school. They were not asked to recall 
‘neutral events’ so as to avoid participants self-selecting the events and consequently 
recalling events with varying emotional tone.   
I also included a low self-esteem and high self-esteem condition in Experiments 2 
and 3 respectively. Laypersons might equate humility to low self-worth, a trait 
synonymous with low self-esteem. The notion that humility involves an assured sense of 
self might make it seems too similar to high self-esteem. As such, humility might be 
confused with both low self-esteem and high self-esteem. However, these constructs are 
different and it is necessary to conceptually and empirically differentiate humility from 
low and high self-esteem by showing that they produce different effects. Evidence in this 










In Experiment 1, participants were asked to list down traits about themselves after 
the humility and feedback manipulation. Previous research found that in general, positive 
attributes of the self becomes more accessible than negative attributes during failures as 
part of the compensatory strategies to eliminate ego-threat (Wood, Giordano-Beech, & 
Ducharme, 1999; Steele, 1988). Hence, it is possible that participants in both neutral and 
humility conditions, not just the neutral condition, would bring to mind more positive 
traits, and also fewer negative traits, when given negative feedback compared to when 
they were not given any feedback. In addition, it is proposed here that humility weakens 
the need to engage self-enhancing strategies to cope with ego threats. Hence, I predicted 
that when given negative feedback, participants in the humility condition should list 
down a lower proportion of positive traits (i.e., higher proportion of negative traits) than 
participants in the neutral condition.  
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty-three undergraduates (52 females; M = 20.36, SD = 1.47) from the National 
University of Singapore (NUS) participated for course credits. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions in a 2 (condition: humility versus neutral) 
× 2 (feedback: negative feedback versus no feedback) factorial design. See Table 2 for 
cell sizes. Gender was not analyzed as a variable across all studies because of the 




 The experiment was carried out in groups of 10 in partitioned cubicles to ensure 
anonymity and privacy. Upon arrival, participants were informed that they would be 
performing several unrelated experiments. The first experiment was presented as a “Scale 
Validation Study” which was a cover for the humility manipulation. Participants in the 
humility condition were asked to recall a humble experience. They were encouraged to 
describe as much details as possible so that anyone reading their description could 
understand their experience. Question prompts (“please indicate how you felt”, “how it 
feels like to be feeling humility”) were given to facilitate recall. Participants were 
instructed not to confuse humility with humiliation, feelings of shame, and low self-worth. 
Definition of humility was also provided, detailing humility as being aware of one’s 
weaknesses, modest of achievements, and acceptance of the fact that there are others who 
are better. In contrast, participants in the neutral condition were asked to describe the 
landmarks (e.g., stations, schools) they encounter while commuting to the school and 
their daily routine on the evening before they go to bed. The purpose of getting the 
neutral participants to describe two activities was to make comparable the time both the 
humility and neutral participants spent on this recall task. 
After the recall, participants proceeded to a task that measured the current 
dependent variable. They were told that they would be participating in a “Conceptual 
Thinking Study” which would measure their ability to think conceptually. Twenty 
questions from the quantitative section of the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) were 
presented using Medialab to the participants. The questions tested logical thinking ability 
in a multiple-choice format and were presented one at a time. Writing materials were 
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provided for the participants to work out the answers. Participants were given up to 45 
seconds to solve each question, after which the next question would appear on the 
computer screen regardless whether they had indicated an answer. The entire task lasted 
15 minutes, after which those in the negative feedback condition were told to wait for a 
short while for their score. About a minute later, they were informed that they scored 
below the 20th percentile of their undergraduate cohort. Those in the no feedback 
condition were not told that their scores could be available and were not informed of their 
results. 
Next, all participants completed the trait-listing task. They were told to list down 
as many positive and negative traits about themselves they could bring to mind at the 
moment. The trait-listing task was self-paced with no time limit. Last, the participants 
completed manipulation checks and demographics items before they were debriefed and 
released. 
Measures 
Reported humility  As a manipulation check for the humility manipulation, 
participants in all conditions rated, on a scale ranging from 1 (strong disagree) to 7 
(strong agree), three items: “Do you think the situation described above reflects 
humility?”, “How humble do you feel right now?”, and “How meek do you feel right 
now?”. Scores for the items were averaged to produce reported humility (α = .90).  
Negative feedback  As manipulation checks for the negative feedback 
manipulation, participants in the negative feedback condition were asked to indicate the 
percentile they scored. They also rated a perceived feedback accuracy item, “How 
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accurate do you perceive the score to be?” on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not 
accurate at all) to 7 (very accurate). 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Humility induction  An independent samples t- test conducted on the reported 
humility indicated participants in the humble condition reported feeling more humble (M 
= 4.80, SD = .45) than those in the neutral condition (M = 2.80, SD = .93), t(61) = 10.89, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .68. 
While these findings might suggest that the manipulation was successful, they 
could still be of suspect considering the validity issues with self-report measures of 
humility. As an added form of manipulation check, I coded the humility condition 
participants’ recall descriptions for the extent to which they were consistent with current 
conceptualizations of humility. By coding whether participants’ recall descriptions 
coincide with theoretical conceptualizations of humility, I am assuming that the 
description can be an indicator, albeit an imperfect one, of how much they had been 
induced into a humble state. It is important to note as a caveat that not everyone who 
writes about humility would feel humble. However, there is considerable evidence from 
affect-induction research using the recall method that writing about specific affective 
states is generally effective at inducing the targeted states.  
Based on the literature review, six humility attributes were identified. They 
appear to be common across many theoretical models and empirical findings (e.g., Myers, 
1979; Hwang, 1982; Means et al., 1990; Clark, 1992; Richards, 1992; Halling, Kunz, & 
Rowe, 1994; Templeton, 1998; Emmons, 1999; Exline & Geyer, 2004; Tangney, 2005). 
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First, humble individuals are thought to have an assured sense of self.  This assured sense 
of self-worth would entails having an accurate sense of one’s strengths and limitations, 
not deliberately magnify their merits nor diminish their weaknesses (Means et al., 1990; 
Templeton, 1998; Tangney, 2000). Humble individuals also have the tendency to keep 
one’s abilities and accomplishments in perspective. This would mean not taking take 
extra credit for accomplishments and not magnifying their strengths to inflate their self-
worth (Means 1995, 2000; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Exline & Greyer, 2004). Further, 
they are willing to acknowledge and accept their mistakes and imperfections (Clark, 1992; 
Emmons, 1999; Jennings et al., 2005). The lack of self-deprecating tendencies is also a 
prominent attribute of the humble. For instance, Gibson (2007) found that individuals 
who self-deprecate are not interested in having an accurate sense of self. This runs 
contrary to what is known about humble individuals; their willingness to see themselves 
accurately. In addition, humble individuals also lack of self-enhancing tendencies (Myers, 
1995; 2000; Means et al., 1990; Richards, 1992). Last, the humble are willing to improve 
on one’s weaknesses (Sandage, 1999; Jennings et al., 2005). 
 Every humility recall description was independently coded by two coders for the 
presence (coded as 1) or absence (coded as 0) of each attribute. That is, each humility 
description could obtain a minimum total score of 0 (i.e., it contained none of the six 
attributes) to the maximum total score of 6 (it contained all attributes). Statements of the 
six attributes as expressed in Table 1 were given to the two coders. One of the coders is 
blind to the purpose of the experiment. Any misconception and disagreement about the 
meaning of each attribute was first discussed and resolved. The coders then proceeded 
with a few descriptions as practice. It was highly unlikely that any participants would so 
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clearly state that, for example, he/she had a sense of self-acceptance. The coders would 
need to read the entire description and make an inference of whether, in this example, the 
participant had exhibited a sense of self-acceptance in the situation he/she described. 
Such coding is unavoidably subjective and hence the need for cross-validation between 
two coders was all the more necessary.  
The coding data, in terms of the percentage of descriptions containing each 
attribute, are presented in Table 1. An intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) of .84 was 
obtained, indicating a high level of agreement between the two coders. Any 
disagreements in coding were resolved and the final rating is presented in Table 1. Given 
that it was not always possible to code an attribute from a description, and also that not 
every attribute would be expressed in every instance of humility (e.g., the participant did 
not have to keep his/her accomplishment in perspective because there was no 
accomplishment in the described situation in the first place), we did not expect the 
proportions to be too high. However, we conducted a one-sample t-test on the proportion 
of each of the attribute against 50% and found that all but “Lack of self-deprecating 
tendencies” is significantly above 50%. This implies that at least 50% of the participants’ 
recall descriptions contained these attributes. Further, assuming that a recall describing 
humility should contained at least 50% of the humble attributes, I conducted another one-
sample t-test comparing the agreed rating against 50% (i.e., at least 3 out of 6 of the 
humble attributes) and found that the recall descriptions contained a significantly higher 
number of humble attributes, t(31) = 2.88, p = .007, ηp2 = .21.   
Note that there was no data to compare these proportions with because the neutral 
condition was asked about landmarks on the way to school which could not be coded. It 
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was therefore not clear whether non-humility descriptions would also contain these 
attributes. This issue would be pursued further in Studies 2 and 3 where the proportion of 
humility attributes were compared with that in two non-humility constructs, low self-
esteem and high self-esteem, respectively.  
Negative feedback induction.  Combining the humility and neutral 
conditions, participants in the negative feedback condition on average indicated that they 
scored on the 17.52th (SD = 2.94) percentile of the cohort. Hence, the negative feedback 
participants in general were accurate in recalling their feedback. Also, there was no 
significant difference between the humility participants (M = 17.25, SD = 2.69) and the 
neutral participants (M = 18.0, SD = 3.46) in the negative feedback condition in terms of 
the percentile feedback they indicated they received, t(24) = .65, p = .53, ηp2 = .57  .  
Further, across the humility and neutral conditions, the average perceived 
feedback accuracy score in the negative feedback condition was 4.88 (SD = .82). Noting 
that perceived feedback accuracy ranged from 1 (not accurate at all) to 7 (very accurate), 
this suggests that the negative feedback participants in general found the feedback to be a 
moderately accurate. A t-test revealed no effect of condition on perceived feedback 
accuracy, t(24) = .99, p = .33, ηp2 = .04 .  
Main Analysis 
 The numbers of positive and negative traits listed in each condition are presented 
in Table 2. In order to control for the differences in the total number of positive and 
negative traits listed, the proportions of positive and negative traits out of the total 
number of traits were computed and analyzed as dependent variables. As the proportions 
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for the positive and negative traits were opposite reflections of each other, only the 
proportion of positive traits was analyzed and discussed.  
A 2 (condition) × 2 (feedback) ANOVA conducted on the proportion of positive 
traits (see Table 2 for the averaged proportions). The analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of condition such that participants in the neutral condition listed more positive 
traits than those in the humility condition, F(1,59) = 4.11, p = .047, ηp2 = .07. There was 
a significant main effect of feedback such that participants in the negative feedback 
condition listed a higher proportion of positive traits than participants in the no feedback 
condition,  F(1,59) = 5.53, p = .022, ηp2 = .09.  
However, the expected interaction effect was not significant, F(1,59) = .003, p 
= .95, ηp2 < .001. Despite the non-significant interaction, I proceeded with simple effect 
analyses. Post-hoc analyses using pair-wise comparisons revealed that when given 
negative feedback, participants in the neutral condition listed more positive traits than 
participants in the humility condition, t(31) = 3.69, p = .001, ηp2= .31 (see Table 2). This 
trend was not observed in the no feedback condition, t(26) = 1.42 p = 0.68, ηp2 = .07 . 
Also, negative feedback led to a significantly higher proportion of positive traits than no 
feedback, in both the humility condition, t(30) = 2.20, p = .04, ηp2 = .14, and the neutral 
condition, t(29) = 3.29, p = .003, ηp2 = .27. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 provided the preliminary support for the current hypotheses. After 
receiving negative feedback, participants in both neutral and humility conditions listed 
more positive traits and less negative traits, than without feedback. Hence, there was 
evidence to suggest that both neutral and humility participants engaged in compensatory 
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strategies during a failure situation by bringing to mind more positive thoughts of 
themselves. There was also some evidence to suggest that this compensatory effect was 
weaker among the humility participants. When given negative feedback, participants in 
the humility condition listed fewer positive traits than those in the neutral condition. This 
pattern was not found when participants were not given any feedback. However, the 
interaction effect was not significant, and the evidence presented here could only be 
considered tentative.   
Despite the promising results from Experiment 1 there was a need to replicate and 
substantiate these preliminary findings. By asking participants to self-report the positive 
and negative self-concepts they can bring to mind, the responses may be susceptible to 
self-presentation motivations. Participants may not respond truthfully due to social 
desirability or impression management. In Experiment 2, a response latency paradigm is 
used to circumvent the limitation of using self-report. Also, by analyzing the response 
latency of both the positive and negative traits separately I will able to examine the 
differential accessibility of positive and negative traits.  An additional low self-esteem 







Experiment 2 was conducted for three reasons. First, it aimed at obtaining 
statistically stronger results. The second objective is to substantiate earlier findings by 
measuring accessibility of positive and negative self-concepts using response latency (i.e., 
reaction time, RT). The accessibility of self-concepts in associative networks can be 
measured by the response speed towards corresponding stimuli (Higgins, 1996). The 
presence of a stimulus representative of a self-concept would be responded to more 
quickly if the self-concept is more accessible. Hence, response latency provides an 
indication of the accessibility of the associated concepts and affords an investigation of 
the differential in accessibility of positive and negative self-concepts as function of 
humility in a failure context. To this end, participants completed a task designed by 
Markus and Kunda (1986) to measure accessibility of implicit self-concepts in which 
they responded “me” or “not me” to a series of positive and negative trait words. 
Differences in reaction time (RT) to the positive and negative trait words as a 
consequence of the same humility and feedback manipulation would be examined.  
The third objective was to differentiate humility from low self-esteem (LSE) by 
examining whether they engender different accessibility of positive and negative self-
concepts in a failure situation. As noted, some dictionaries portray humility negatively by 
equating it low self-esteem (e.g., Longman Dictionary). However, there are marked 
differences between humility and LSE. LSE individuals have a tendency to compound 
the effects of their failure by increasing negative thoughts regarding themselves and 
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overgeneralizing their weaknesses to unrelated domains (Kernis, Brockner, & Frankel, 
1989; Brown & Dutton, 1995).  They would not only accept negative feedback regarding 
themselves in the event of a failure, but would also evaluate themselves very negatively 
thereafter (Shrauger, 1975; Shrauger & Rosenberg, 1970; McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981). 
In contrast, as argued, humble individuals might accept the negative feedback but they 
should be less critical of themselves. Also, it is posited here that they are less likely to 
trigger a high amount of negative self-concepts following a failure. To examine whether 
humility and LSE produce different effects, LSE was also manipulated, using the same 
recall technique.  
 Taking into consideration the findings from Experiment 1 and research on LSE, I 
hypothesized that with negative feedback, the neutral condition should display the 
shortest RT to positive trait words followed by the humility condition, and LSE condition 
should exhibit the longest RT. A reverse trend was hypothesized for the negative trait 
words; i.e., when given negative feedback, the neutral participants should show the 
longest RT followed by humility participants, with LSE participants displaying the 
shortest RT. In addition, it was hypothesized that participants in both neutral and humility 
conditions would respond faster to the positive trait words, and slower to the negative 
trait words, when given negative feedback compared to when they were not given any 
feedback, whereas participants in the LSE condition would respond slower to the positive 
trait words, and faster to the negative trait words, in the negative feedback condition as 







 185 NUS undergraduates (135 females; mean age = 20.0; SD – 1.56) participated 
for partial course credits. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the six 
conditions in a 3 (condition: humility versus neutral versus low self-esteem [LSE]) by 2 
(feedback: negative feedback versus no feedback) factorial design. Cell sizes are 
indicated in Table 4. 9 participants failed the manipulation checks and were removed (to 
be described further in Results). 
Procedure  
 As in Experiment 1, participants completed all tasks in isolated cubicles. The first 
task was the same recall task used in Experiment 1 but with an additional LSE condition. 
Participants in this condition were asked to recall an incident which affected their self-
esteem in a negative way. This was defined to them as an incident which made them had 
negative evaluations of themselves and low self-esteem was further defined as a state of 
worthlessness. As in the humility and neutral conditions, they were encouraged to 
describe as much details as possible, and were furnished with similar question prompts. 
They then completed the “Conceptual Thinking Study” as in Experiment 1. Next, 
participants completed the self-concept accessibility task. Accessibility of positive and 
negative self-concepts was measured using response latency. Participants were told that 
their self-perception will be measured. The whole self-perception task including the 
instructions was administered using the E-prime program. The instructions explain that 
on each trial, they would be presented with a trait and they had to indicate whether the 
trait was representative of them by pressing specific keys (one marked as self and the 
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other marked as “non-self”) on the button box. Detailed instructions were given to 
emphasize the importance of responding as quickly as possible while being accurate with 
their response. Participants were asked to place their left and right index finger on the 
specific buttons before the task commenced. In this task, participants went through a 
block consisting of 60 main trials for 2 times. The block consists of 20 positive traits, 20 
negative traits and 20 neutral traits. The presentation of the trials within the block was 
randomized across participants. For each trial, a fixation cross (+) was presented at the 
centre of the screen for 1000ms, followed by either the positive trait, negative trait or 
neutral word. These traits/words were presented for 3000ms. Response to the trait/word 
was self-paced but if a response is not made after 3000ms, it would skip to the next 
trait/word. A 1000ms break was given between each block. This task was adapted from 
Markus and Kunda (1986) where participants need to respond “me” or “not me” to 
stimuli relating to specific traits. Finally, the participants completed manipulation checks 
and demographics items before they were debriefed and released. 
Measures 
Reported humility  Participants in all conditions rated the same reported 
humility as in Experiment 1 (α = .83).  
Negative feedback  Participants in the negative feedback condition were also 
asked the same percentile question and rated the same perceived feedback accuracy item.  
 State self-esteem  Participants in all conditions completed a modified version 
of state self-esteem scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) consisting of performance and 
social factors that are thought to be sensitive to changes in different aspects of self-
concepts. The scale using a five-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 
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(extremely). The appearance component was removed because it was found to be 
relatively stable in face of laboratory or academic failures (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). 
Also, this factor is irrelevant to the current failure design of the experiment. 
Self-concept Accessibility Task Using frequency of appearance, the traits 
given by participants from Experiment 1 were ranked. Based on the ranking, I generated 
a list of 40 traits (20 positive and 20 negative). The positive traits used were “easy-going”, 
“thoughtful”, “knowledgeable”, “selfless”, “determined”, “hardworking”, “friendly”, 
“patient”, “trustworthy”, “respectful”, “loyal”, “sociable”, “organized”, “helpful”, 
“responsible”, “compassionate”, “strong-willed”, “forgiving”, “conscientious”, and 
“confident”. The negative traits used were “tactless”, “disorganized”, “procrastinator”, 
“immature”, “ lack of confidence”, “insensitive”, “cynical”, “un-forgiving”, “stubborn”, 
“hot-tempered”, ”careless”, “selfish”, “messy”, “harsh”, “lazy”, “non-resilient”, “un-
motivated”, “impatient”, “un-expressive”, and “lack of sympathy”. In addition, I also 
generated a list of neutral words consisting of “structured”, “vertical”, “advanced”, 
“horizontal”, “basic”, “circle”, “pointed”, “floating”, “curved”, “transparent”, “gravity”, 
“translucent”, “frontal”, “concave”, “linear”, “fundamental”, “angled”, “cloudy”, 
“dormant”, and “opaque”. This list of traits/words were then checked using the English 
Lexicon Project (ELP; see http://elexicon.wustl.edu/) database to examine the lexical 
characteristics. Only words that were fairly equivalent in terms of usage frequency and 
word length were used.1  
 
 
                                                 
1
 The three word types did not differ in usage frequency, F(2,57) = 2.58, p = .08, ηp2 





Humility induction  An one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
condition on reported humility, F(2,173) = 17.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .17. Independent 
samples t- tests indicated that participants in the humility condition reported feeling more 
humble (M = 4.59, SD = .66) than those in the neutral condition (M = 3.16, SD = 1.27), 
t(111) = 12.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .58, and those in the LSE condition (M = 3.21, SD = 
1.12), t(116) = 9.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .44, and no difference between the neutral and LSE 
conditions, t(119) = .21, p = .836, ηp2 < .001.  
As in Experiment 1, the presence/absence of the same six humility attributes in 
the descriptions was independently coded by two coders. Recalled descriptions from both 
humility and LSE conditions were coded, so that the extent to which the attributes were 
present in both types of descriptions could be compared. A high degree of inter-rater 
reliability was obtained, intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) = .93. As shown in 
Table 1, the attribute proportions in the humility condition were comparable to those 
obtained in Experiment 1. All of the attributes were significantly above 50%, implying 
that at least half of the participants’ recall descriptions contained the attributes.  In 
contrast, none of the recall descriptions in the LSE condition contained any of the humble 
attributes hence comparisons between both conditions were not possible. I then 
conducted another one-sample t-test comparing the agreed rating against 50% and it was 
found that the recalled humility descriptions contain at least 50% of the humility traits, 
t(54) = 3.25, p = .002,  ηp2 = .16.   
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Induction of Low self-esteem  A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant 
effect of condition on state self-esteem, F(2,173) = 7.41, p = .001, ηp2 = .08 . Further 
independent samples t- tests showed that participants in LSE condition (M = 2.69, SD 
= .48) were lower in state self-esteem compared to those in the humility condition (M = 
3.04, SD = .56), t(116) = 3.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, and those in the neutral condition (M 
= 3.05, SD = .69), t(119) = 3.30, p = .001, ηp2 = .08. No difference in state self-esteem 
was found between the humility and neutral conditions, t(111) = .07, p = .95, ηp2 < .001.  
Negative feedback induction  9 negative feedback participants (3 from the 
humility condition, 5 from the neutral condition and 1 from the LSE condition) 
incorrectly recalled their scores to be more than the 20th percentile and were removed 
from the analysis. All other negative feedback participants correctly recalled their 
feedback score. Average perceived feedback accuracy score in the negative feedback 
condition (across the humility, neutral, and LSE conditions) was 5.28 (SD = 1.10). Hence, 
the negative feedback participants in general found the feedback to be moderately 
accurate. A one-way ANOVA revealed no effect of condition on perceived feedback 
accuracy, F(2.92) = .16, p = .85, ηp2 < .001 .  
Main Analysis 
Before analyzing the latency response, the concern of whether the number of self 
and non-self responses differed across the six conditions and between the positive and 
negative traits should first be addressed. Such differential responding could in turn 
account for differences in latency responses. For example, slower responses to the 
positive trait words by humility participants as compared to the neutral participants in the 
feedback condition might not imply weaker accessibility of positive self-concepts in the 
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humility participants but could be due to the lower relevance of these positive traits to the 
humility participants (put differently, the humility participants indicated less self 
responses and more nonself responses to the positive trait words than the neutral 
participants).  
To address this concern, I subjected the mean number of self responses (i.e., 
positive-self and negative-self) in a 3 (condition: humble versus neutral versus LSE) × 2 
(feedback: negative feedback versus no feedback) × 2 (traits: positive versus negative) 
mixed ANOVA. There was no significant main effect of condition, F(2,170) = .38, p 
=.68, ηp2 = .004, and feedback, F(1,170) = 1.00, p =.32, ηp2 = .004. The interactions 
were also not significant: condition × feedback, F(2,170) = .16, p =.85, ηp2 = .002, 
condition × traits, F(2,170) = .30, p =.74, ηp2 = .004, feedback × traits, F(1,170) = .007, p 
=.94, ηp2 < .001, and condition × feedback × traits, F(2,170) = .34, p =.71, ηp2 = .004. 
Note that nonself responses were not analyzed as they are reverse reflections of the 
analyzed indexes. This indicates that participants across the conditions have similar 
patterns of response tendencies. That is, the number of “positive-self” and “negative-self” 
responses do not differ significantly between the conditions (refer to Table 3).  
I also examined the response latency of self and nonself responses. Following 
standard procedure in analyzing reaction time (RT) data, the raw RT data (in milliseconds) 
was subjected to a logarithm transformation because of the positive skew in reaction time 
data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). All subsequent analyses were conducted on these 
logged scores but the raw RT will be presented for ease of understanding. It was found 
that self responses (across both positive and negative traits) were faster (M = 938.66) than 
nonself responses (M = 1038.39), t(175) = 12.60, p = .007, ηp2 = .47. This finding is 
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consistent with past literature that negative or nonself responses will take longer (Fazio, 
1990; Dodgson & Wood, 1998).  Though the response latency of self and nonself 
responses is significantly different, this finding do not pose as a problem because first, 
participants do not differ in their tendency to respond self and nonself across conditions 
and second, most participants did not select nonself to the positive traits nor self to the 
negative traits (an average of 90% of the responses for positive traits was self and for 
negative traits was nonself; refer to Table 3).  
Next, I examined if the response latency differs significantly across positive and 
negative traits. For this, I conducted a 3 (condition: humble versus neutral versus LSE) × 
2 (feedback: negative feedback versus no feedback) × 2 (traits: positive versus negative) 
mixed ANOVA. The main effect of condition is not significant, F(2,170) = .36, p =.70, 
ηp2 = .004 while a significant main effect of feedback was obtained, F(1,170) = 4.82, p 
=.03, ηp2 = .28. The interaction of condition × feedback is significant, F(2,170) = 2.57, p 
=.03, ηp2 = .19. Most importantly, the three-way interaction is also significant, F(2,170) 
= 20.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. This implies that the response latency differs significantly 
between positive and negative traits. This supports the previous finding that nonself 
responses are significantly slower than self responses. As an average of 90% of the 
responses for the negative traits were nonself and for the positive traits were self, the 
response latency between positive and negative traits will clearly differs. As such, the 
accessibility of positive and negative traits were analyzed and presented separately.  
Accessibility of positive self-concepts  The logged RT for the positive self-
concepts were submitted to a 3 (condition: humble versus neutral versus LSE) × 2 
(feedback: negative feedback versus no feedback) ANOVA revealed a significant main 
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effect of condition, F(2,170) = 23.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .22, a significant main effect of 
feedback, F(1,170) = 6.11, p = .01, ηp2 = .04, and a significant interaction, F(2,170) = 
13.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. Post-hoc analyses revealed that after given negative feedback, 
participants in neutral condition responded faster (M = 836.1) to the positive traits then 
participants in humble condition (M = 931.1), t(60) = 2.15, p = .04,  ηp2 = .07 while the 
latter responded faster to participants in LSE condition (M = 1201.8), t(61) = 5.09, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .30. No significant difference among the conditions was found in the no 
feedback condition, F(2,79) = .99, p = .37,  ηp2 = .01. 
Further analyses revealed within neutral condition, participants who received the 
negative feedback responded faster to the positive traits presented than those without 
negative feedback, (M = 1014.4), t(56) = 4.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .27. The same trend was 
observed in humble condition; participants who in the negative feedback condition 
responded faster to positive traits presented than those in the no feedback condition, (M = 
1026.2), t(53) = 2.28, p = .03,  ηp2 = .09. A reverse pattern was found in the LSE 
condition such that participants who received the negative feedback displayed a slower 
response to the positive traits than participants who received no feedback, (M = 1067.6), 
t(61) = 2.55, p = .01, ηp2 = .10 (see means in Table 4). 
Accessibility of negative self-concepts The same analyses conducted on the 
logged RT of the negative self-concepts revealed a significant main effect of condition, 
F(2,170) = 27.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .25, and a significant interaction, F(2,170) = 7.40, p 
= .001, ηp2 = .08. It was also found in negative feedback condition, participants in 
humble condition (M = 1005.7) have a shorter RT to the negative traits presented than 
participants in the neutral condition, (M = 1210.1), t(60) = 4.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .29 
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while participants in the LSE condition displayed the shortest RT, (M = 867.4), t(61) = 
3.13, p = .003,  ηp2 = .14. It was also found that the conditions differed significantly even 
in no feedback condition, F(2,79) = 4.21, p = .02, ηp2 = .05. Pair-wise comparisons 
revealed that participants in LSE condition (M = 963.5) responded faster to the negative 
traits compared to participants in neutral (M = 1090.5), t(56) = 2.48, p = .02,  ηp2 = .10 
and humble condition (M = 1078.2), t(53) = 2.58, p = .01,  ηp2 = .11.  
Further analyses revealed that within neutral condition, participants who were 
given negative feedback showed a longer RT than those with no feedback, (M = 1090.5), 
t(56) = 2.77, p = .008, ηp2 = .12. No difference was found for those in humble condition, 
t(53) = 1.52, p = .14,  ηp2 = .04. That is, participants in negative feedback condition did 
not respond significantly different from those in no feedback condition. Again, a reverse 
trend was found within LSE condition such that participants who received negative 
feedback responded faster to the negative traits presented than those who did not received 
feedback, (M = 963.5), t(61) = 2.49, p = .02,  ηp2 = .09 (see means in Table 4). 
Discussion 
Using a response latency paradigm, several results from Experiment 1 concerning 
the differences between humility and neutral conditions were conceptually replicated and 
differences between humility and LSE conditions were demonstrated.  
First, as predicted, when given negative feedback, participants induced to feel 
humility displayed lower accessibility of positive self-concepts, but higher accessibility 
of negative self-concepts, than that of those in the neutral condition. These differences in 
the accessibility of positive and negative self-concepts were consistent with the 
differences in the proportion of positive and negative traits listed in Experiment 1. In 
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addition, as hypothesized, negative feedback increased the accessibility of positive self-
concepts relative to no feedback among the humility participants, but did not affect the 
accessibility of negative self-concepts.  These results suggest that failures would heighten 
the accessibility of positive self-concepts in humble people but would not affect the 
accessibility of their negative self-concepts. In contrast, the neutral participants 
demonstrated both an increase in accessibility of their positive self-concepts, and a 
decrease in accessibility of their negative self-concepts, in the negative feedback 
condition relative to the no feedback condition. These findings are consistent with the 
general strategy of self-enhancement following ego-threats in which positive self-
concepts are emphasized and negative self-concepts rejected (Sedikides & Strube, 1995). 
The results revealed substantial differences between humility and LSE. Under the 
negative feedback condition, the humility participants showed a higher level of 
accessibility of positive self-concept, and a lower level of accessibility of negative self-
concept, than the LSE participants. Also in contrast to the humility participants, and in 
direct opposite to the neutral participants, the LSE participants showed a higher 
accessibility of negative self-concepts, and a lower accessibility of positive self-concepts, 
following negative feedback relative to no feedback. The results suggest that LSE 
individuals not only tend not to activate positive self-information in a failure situation 
which humble individuals are more likely to do, they also tend not to activate the self-
enhancing strategies typical of the average person when dealing with an ego-threat. The 
results also indicate that the LSE participants exhibited higher accessibility to negative 
self-concepts compared to the neutral participants in the no feedback condition, thus 
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suggesting that the arithmetic task alone (without feedback) may be threatening to those 







Experiment 3 has two objectives. First, it aimed to test the robustness of the 
findings in Experiments 2 concerning the difference between the humility and neutral 
conditions, using the same latency response task. Second, instead of a LSE condition, a 
high self-esteem (HSE) condition was induced (using the recall method) so as to 
differentiate the effects of humility and HSE. It is posited that humble people enjoy a 
good sense of self-worth. However, HSE individuals are also known to have a positive 
sense of self-worth and it remained a question whether humble and HSE would elicit 
similar or differences responses to failure. It has been found that HSE tend to respond 
less negatively to failures as they are able to recruit positive thoughts of themselves 
following a failure (Dodgson & Wood, 1998). Further, they are more likely to employ 
compensatory strategies such as discrediting the negative feedback or attributing failures 
to external environment (Blaine & Crocker, 1993). In contrast, although humble 
individuals are also aware of their strengths, they are just as likely to be aware of their 
weaknesses. Hence, they will be less likely to resort to such compensatory strategies to 
cope with a failure. 
I hypothesized that after negative feedback, the HSE participants should display 
the shortest RT to positive traits words, followed by the neutral condition, and the humble 
participates should demonstrate the longest RT, and the reverse pattern was expected for 
the negative traits words. In addition, I hypothesized that participants in all three 
conditions (i.e., HSE, humble and neutral) would again respond faster to the positive trait 
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words when given negative feedback compared to when they were not given any 
feedback. I predicted that both the HSE and neutral participants would respond slower to 
the negative trait words following negative feedback relative to no feedback. No 
prediction was made with regard to the humility participants’ responses to the negative 
trait words as a function of feedback. 
Method 
Participants 
 133 participants (37 males and 99 females) from NUS took part in the experiment 
in exchange for partial course credits. The average age of the participants is 20.3 (SD = 
1.27). 6 participants were excluded as they failed the manipulation checks (to be 
described further in Results). The participants were randomly assigned to one of the six 
conditions in a 3 (condition: neutral versus humble versus HSE) by 2 (feedback: no 
feedback versus negative feedback) factorial design.  
Procedure  
 The procedure was the same as that of Experiment 2 except the change in HSE 
condition. Participants in this condition were asked to recall an incident which lifted their 
self-esteem. This was defined to them as an incident which made them had highly 
positive evaluations of themselves. High self-esteem was further defined as feeling 
successful and having positive aspects of themselves that they feel proud of. As in the 
humility condition, they were encouraged to describe as much details as possible, and 
were furnished with similar question prompts. They then went thru the same “Conceptual 





 Reported humility  Participants in all conditions rated the same 
reported humility as in Experiments 1 and 2 (α = .81).  
Negative feedback  Participants in the negative feedback condition were also 
asked the same percentile question and rated the same perceived feedback accuracy item.  
 State self-esteem The same modified version of state self-esteem scale 
(Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) was used an in Experiment 2. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Induction of Humility  Reliability analysis conducted on the manipulation 
check items revealed a high Cronbach’s α of .81. A one-way ANOVA conducted on the 
reported humility indicated participants in humble condition rated feeling more humble 
(M = 4.71, SD =.50) than participants in neutral condition (M = 2.98, SD = .67) and HSE 
condition (M = 3.57, SD = .75), F(2,127) = 80.74, p < .001,  ηp2 = .57. This indicated 
that the manipulation was successful. Two coders (one of them blind to the research 
hypothesis) coded the presence/absence of the same six humility attributes in the recall 
descriptions. A high inter-rater reliability was obtained, intra-class correlation coefficient 
(ICC) = .85. The attribute proportions in the humility condition were comparable to those 
obtained in Experiment 1 and 2 (see Table 1). All of the humble attributes except “An 
assured sense of self-worth” and “Willingness to improve on the imperfection” were 
significantly above 50%. This implies that at least half of the participants’ recall 
descriptions contained the other four attributes. In contrast, the humble attributes 
proportions in the HSE condition were extremely low (< 5%), and also were so low in 
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variance that analyses on them would not be meaningful. I then conducted another one-
sample t-test comparing the agreed rating against 50% and it was found that the recalled 
humility descriptions contain at least 50% of the humility traits, t(46) = 5.93, p < .001,  
ηp2 = .43. 
Negative Feedback 6 participants recalled their scores to be less than the 20th 
percentile (1 from the humility condition, 3 from the neutral condition and 2 from the 
HSE condition). The average rating of accuracy is 5.10 (SD = .98) which ranges from 1 
(not accurate at all) to 7 (very accurate).  
Induction of High self-esteem  Participants in HSE condition (M = 3.84, SD 
= .74) indicated higher ratings of self-esteem than humble (M = 3.02, SD = .61) and 
neutral condition (M = 2.89, SD = .56), F(2,124) = 26.14, p < .001,  ηp2 = .30. 
Main Analysis 
A 3 (condition: humble versus neutral versus LSE) × 2 (feedback: negative 
feedback versus no feedback) × 2 (traits: positive versus negative) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted on the mean number of self responses (see Experiment 2). No significant main 
effects of condition, F(2,121) = 1.60, p = .206, ηp2 = .03, and feedback, F(1,121) = 2.76, 
p = .10, ηp2 = .02 were found. The interactions were also not significant: condition × 
feedback, F(2,121) = 1.29, p =.28, ηp2 = .02, condition × traits, F(2,121) = .03, p =.97, 
ηp2 < .001, feedback × traits, F(1,121) = .09, p =.76, ηp2 = .001, and condition × 
feedback × traits, F(2,121) = 1.23, p =.30, ηp2 = .02.The results indicate that participants 
across the conditions do not differ in their response tendencies. Again, consistent with 
past literature it was found that participants RT for self responses were faster (M = 723.6) 
than nonself responses (M = 819.8). And since the conditions do not differ in their 
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response latency, the difference in RT for self and nonself responses do not pose as a 
potential artifact. In addition, most participants select self for the positive traits and 
nonself for the negative traits (an average of 90% of the responses). 
To examine if the response latency differs significantly across positive and 
negative traits, I subjected the RT to a 3 (condition: humble versus neutral versus LSE) × 
2 (feedback: negative feedback versus no feedback) × 2 (traits: positive versus negative) 
mixed ANOVA. There is no significant main effect of condition, F(2,121) = 1.59, p =.21, 
ηp2 = .02. A significant main effect of feedback, F(1,121) = 5.05, p =.03, ηp2 = .04, a 
significant condition × feedback interaction, F(1,121) = 3.75, p =.03, ηp2 = .06, and a 
significant condition × feedback × traits interaction, F(1,121) = 3.95, p =.02, ηp2 = .06 
were obtained. This implies that the response latency differs significantly between 
positive and negative traits. As such, the accessibility of positive and negative traits were 
analyzed and presented separately. The finding that nonself responses are significantly 
slower than self responses was supported. And because an average of 90% of the 
responses for the negative traits were nonself and for the positive traits were self, the 
response latency between positive and negative traits will differs. 
Accessibility of positive self-concepts   A 3 (condition: humble versus 
neutral versus HSE) × 2 (feedback: negative feedback versus no feedback) ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(2,121) = 5.38, p = .01, ηp2 = .08, and a 
significant main effect of feedback, F(1,121) = 37.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .24. Post-hoc 
analyses revealed that after given negative feedback, participants in neutral condition 
responded faster (M = 799.5) to the positive traits than participants in humble condition 
(M = 908.7), t(40) = 3.65, p = .001,  ηp2 = .25 and participants in HSE condition (M = 
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910.0), t(39) = 2.55, p = .02,  ηp2 = .14. There is no significant difference between 
humble and HSE condition t(41) = .22, p = .82, ηp2 < .001 and among the conditions 
when feedback was not given, F(2,61) = 1.02, p = .37, ηp2 = .03. 
Further analyses revealed that in all three conditions, participants who received 
the negative feedback responded faster to the positive traits than those not given any 
feedback, all ts > 2.32 and ps < .001 (see means in Table 5).  
Accessibility of negative self-concepts The same analyses conducted 
revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(2,121) = 4.08, p = .02, ηp2 = .06, and a 
significant interaction, F(2,121) = 4.78, p = .01, ηp2 = .07. It was also found in negative 
feedback condition, participants in humble condition RT (M = 927.9) have a shorter RT 
to the negative traits presented than participants in neutral condition, (M = 1184.9), t(40) 
= 2.60, p = .01,  ηp2 = .14 and participants in HSE condition, (M = 1163.4), t(41) = 2.48, 
p = .02,  ηp2 = .13. However, there is no significant difference between neutral and HSE 
conditions, t(45) = .39, p = .71,  ηp2 < .001.There is also no significant difference among 
the conditions when participants were not given any feedback, F(2,63) = .13, p = .88, ηp2 
= .004 .  
Further analyses revealed that within the humble condition, there were no 
significant different between participants who received negative feedback and those 
without any feedback, t(44) = 1.39, p = .17,  ηp2 = .04. Within both neutral and HSE 
conditions, participants displayed a longer RT when given negative feedback compared 
to those not given any feedback, t(38)neutral = 2.65, p = .01, ηp2 = .15, and , t(39)HSE = 





Experiment 3 largely replicated the findings of Experiment 2 with regard to the 
differences between the humility and neutral conditions. Following negative feedback, 
the humility participants showed lower accessibility of positive self-concepts, but higher 
accessibility of negative self-concepts, than the neutral participants. As in Experiment 2, 
the failure feedback increased the accessibility of positive self-concepts and decreased 
the accessibility of negative self-concepts among the neutral participants relative to no 
feedback. Also replicating Experiment 2, the failure feedback increased the accessibility 
of positive self-concepts among the humility participants relative to no feedback, but did 
not affect the accessibility of their negative self-concepts. Overall, the results support the 
current contention that humility mutes the self-enhancing, compensatory mechanism 
typically activated under neutral conditions in response to ego-threats.  
The results also indicated significant differences between humility and HSE 
participants. After negative feedback, humility participants exhibited higher accessibility 
to negative self-concepts than HSE participants as predicted, though, there were no 
significant differences between them in terms of the accessibility of positive self-
concepts. The accessibility of positive self-concepts increased in the feedback condition 
relative to no feedback for both the humility and HSE participants, but it was only the 
HSE participants who demonstrated weaker accessibility of negative self-concepts. These 






 In the current research, I posited that humility enables non-defensive 
response to failures. Existing findings suggest that humility is associated with an assured 
sense of self-worth and a willingness to acknowledge and accept one’s shortcomings. 
Drawing from this literature, I proposed that individuals in a state of humility are less 
likely to cope with failures using self-enhancing strategies. More specifically, whereas 
people tend to respond to by failures by emphasizing their strengths and rejecting their 
weaknesses, humble individuals are less likely to magnify their strengths or diminish 
their weaknesses. Therefore, I hypothesized that humility should lead to a weaker 
activation of positive self-concepts and stronger activation of negative self-concepts 
compared to the neutral state. Promising evidence was obtained that supported the 
hypothesis.  
Across three experiments, humility was induced by having participants recalled 
personal incidents of humility. There is good evidence from the manipulation checks and 
coding of the recall descriptions that this method was effective in inducing participants to 
feel humble. In Experiment 1, a self-report listing method was used to measure activation 
of positive and negative self-concepts. It was found that participants induced with 
humility listed a significantly lower proportion of positive self-traits than those in the 
neutral condition after receiving a negative feedback. This finding was conceptually 
replicated in Experiments 2 and 3. Using a response latency paradigm in both 
experiments, it was found that after receiving negative feedback, neutral condition 
responded faster to the positive self-concepts than humble condition. This pattern was not 
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found when participants were not given any negative feedback. A reversed pattern was 
found for the negative self-concepts such that while the neutral condition displayed a 
longer RT than humble participants. Within both the humble and neutral conditions, 
participants displayed heightened accessibility (i.e., shorter RT) to the positive self-
concepts after receiving negative feedback than when they were not given any feedback. 
A reverse pattern was found for the negative self-concepts in the neutral condition such 
that after receiving negative feedback, they reacted slower to the negative self-concepts 
than when they did not receive any feedback. This was not the case for humble condition 
which did not show any differences in the RT of the negative self-concepts regardless of 
negative feedback. 
To demonstrate the conceptual differences between humility with LSE and HSE, 
the conditions were added to Experiment2 and 3 respectively. In Experiment 2 after 
receiving negative feedback, the LSE condition showed the longest RT to positive self-
concepts among the three conditions. In addition, they also displayed a significantly 
shorter RT to the negative self-concepts than both humble and neutral conditions even 
without any negative feedback. Within the condition, after receiving negative feedback, 
they responded slower to the positive self-concepts compared to no feedback given. In 
Experiment 3 with a change of high self-esteem (HSE) condition, it was found that after 
receiving negative feedback, neutral condition responded faster to the positive self-
concepts than both humble and HSE conditions. However, both HSE and neutral 
conditions showed longer RT to the negative self-concepts compared to humble condition. 
These were not found when participants were not given any negative feedback. Within all 
three conditions, participants who received the negative feedback responded faster to the 
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positive traits than those not given any feedback. For the negative self-concepts, within 
both neutral and HSE conditions those received negative feedback have a longer RT than 
those without feedback. This was not found for the humble condition.   
Reconciling the findings with Literature 
Self-enhancing is a common strategy to cope with failures (Feick & Rhodewalt, 
1997; Sedikides & Strube, 1995; Arkin, 1981). This strategy includes people 
undermining their failures by reminding themselves of their positive traits (Baumeister & 
Jones, 1978; Steele, 1988). This coping strategy was clearly displayed in the neutral 
condition. After negative feedback, the neutral condition participants displayed 
heightened accessibility of positive self-concepts and decreased accessibility of negative 
self-concepts. Humble individuals, on the other hand, displayed such tendencies to a 
significantly lesser degree. Compared to the neutral conditions participants, they 
demonstrated weaker activation of positive self-concepts and stronger activation of 
negative self-concepts. These findings appear consistent with existing profile of humble 
individuals which construes them as less prone to brag about their strengths and 
downplay their weaknesses in the presence of an ego-threat (Sandage, 1999; Emmons, 
1999; Jennings et al., 2005). The findings are also consistent with a view expounded by 
Carl Rogers (1961) that secured individuals are able to experience and accept every 
aspects of themselves, both the good and bad, and feel less compelled to continually seek 
the approval of others. Humble individuals are known to display qualities associated with 
secure individuals, including an affirmed sense of self-worth and less defensive approach 
in reacting to personal affronts. The current findings provide further empirical indications 
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that humble individuals are high self-acceptance and feel less need to protect their 
identity or self-esteem when attacked.  
After the negative feedback, LSE individuals responded slower to the positive 
self-concepts (i.e., longer RT) than the neutral participants. Yet, a reverse pattern was 
seen for the negative self-concepts; LSE responded quicker than neutral participants. The 
findings in the LSE condition are consistent with the literature which supports the notion 
that individuals with low self-esteem tend not to engage in self-enhancing strategies 
following failures (Baumeister, 1982). Further, they are also known to overgeneralize 
their weaknesses in response to failures (Kernis et al., 1989; Brown & Dutton, 1995). It is 
notable that even without negative feedback, the LSE condition participants displayed a 
heightened accessibility of negative self-concepts. This implies that the arithmetic task 
itself poses as a threat, and may also suggests that LSE is associated a chronic heightened 
activation of self-concepts under neutral conditions with no ego-threat whatsoever.  
HSE individuals are considered to have a secured sense of self-esteem and past 
research have shown that individuals with healthy self-esteem are more able to focus on 
their strengths as an adaptive response to life’s challenges like a failure (Brown & Smart, 
1991; Spencer et al., 1993; Dodgson & Wood, 1998). This was demonstrated in the 
current research. When HSE participants were given negative feedback, they displayed a 
heightened accessibility of positive self-concepts (i.e., shorter RT). Studies have also 
found that individuals with HSE are particularly prone to engage in compensatory 
strategies such after a failure (Wood, Giordano-Beech, Taylor, Michela, & Gaus, 1994), 
probably more so than humble individuals. Consistent findings were found in Experiment 
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3; after receiving negative feedback HSE participants displayed a diminished 
accessibility of negative self-concepts compared to humble participants.  
Though the current method of failure manipulation has been demonstrated to 
successfully induce feelings of failure (e.g., Dodgson & Wood, 1998), I do acknowledge 
that having a negative feedback do not equate to experience of failure. However the 
current findings seem to suggest that participants do experience failure (hence the 
increase accessibility to positive self-concepts and the converse diminished accessibility 
to negative self-concepts). Nonetheless, further studies can explore using an alternate 
method of failure manipulation. 
Further Implications and Conclusion 
 The idea that the trait humility bestows positive life outcomes has been 
consistently suggested (Emmons, 1999; Exline & Geyer, 2004; Petersen & Seligman, 
2004; Tangney, 2002). For instance, humble employees often demonstrate willingness to 
learn and responding positively to negative feedback (Reave, 2005) which will benefit 
their interpersonal relationships. Correlations have also been found between humility and 
good academic results (Johnson, Rowatt, & Petrini, 2011; Rowatt et al., 2006). This 
character strength helps one to adapt to life adversaries. As demonstrated in the current 
research, humble individuals are able to take failures in their stride. Having an assured 
sense of self help the humble to focus on their strengths in order to cope with the ego 
threat. Yet, this focus is not an inflation of positive self-views. Further, they are willing to 
accept their shortcomings and are not compel to reject negative self-information to 
disconfirm the undesirable failure feedback.  
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 Failures are inevitable in life and they affect some more than others. Humble 
individuals are particularly not as affected by personal failures. Being able to accept 
one’s limitations will oriented one towards learning and growth. This might suggests that 
humble individuals have a higher subjective wellbeing than the non-humble people. 
These predictive associations can be studied in future research.  
As noted earlier, humility is a dynamic and possibly multi-dimensional construct. 
Furthermore, the potential benefits of humility make this an important construct to 
examine. However, the lack of a suitable measurement tool combined with the richness 
of this construct makes it difficult to study. And because of this lack of theory-based, 
reliable and valid measure, empirical research on humility remained limited. There is a 
need to sharpen the measurement technique for which the field can be advanced. With a 
reliable and valid measurement tool, the current results can be replicated. In the current 
research, the recall method proves to be an effective way of humility induction but this 
method does have its cons. Though definition of humility was given in the process of 
doing a situation recall, participants can still hold a mistaken view of the trait. Further, 
dispositional humility cannot be assessed with the current method as well. Nonetheless, 
though the risk of having a mistaken view of humility exists, steps have been taken to 
minimize this possibility. For instance, all recall descriptions were coded to check the 
recall content coincides with what is known regarding humility.  
 Humility is more than a personality trait; it is a character strength that influences 
how we cope with failures. Indeed, the three experiments support the notion that being 
humble enables one to draw on his or her strengths to buffer against failures. Yet, these 
strengths are not falsely inflated. Having an assured sense of self-worth means that these 
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humble individuals do not shun negative feedback, rather they would acknowledge and 





Percentage of Humility Traits in Participants Recall Descriptions (Experiments 1 to 3) 
* percentage significantly above 50%, p < .001 
 Experiment 1 
(ICC = .84) 
 Experiment 2 
(ICC = .93) 
 Experiment 3 
(ICC = .85) 


















List of Humility Traits 
 
           
1. An assured sense of self-
worth (i.e., an accurate sense 
of one’s strengths and 
weaknesses)  
 
53.1 56.3 56.3*  52.4 50.8 52.*  41.7 45.0 45.0 
2. Tendency to keep one’s 
abilities and accomplishments 
in perspective  
 
56.3 59.4 59.4*  63.5 58.7 58.7*  63.3 60.0 63.3* 
3. Willingness to acknowledge 
and accept one’s mistakes and 
imperfections  
 
65.6 59.4 65.6*  63.5 61.9 63.5*  53.3 56.7 56.7* 
4. Lack of self-deprecating 
tendencies  
 
46.9 50.0 50.0  53.9 49.2 53.9*  60.0 66.7 66.7* 
5. Free from arrogance  
 
62.5 59.4 59.4*  68.3 71.4 71.4*  70.0 65.0 70.0* 
6. Willingness to improve on the 
imperfection  
 
59.4 53.1 53.1*  50.8 63.5 63.5*  51.7 50.0 50.0 
            
Average % of traits in recall 
description 




Proportion of Positive Traits listed across conditions (Experiment 1) 
 Humble  Neutral 
 Negative 
Feedback 
(n = 17) 
No 
Feedback 
(n = 15) 
 Negative 
Feedback 
(n = 18) 
No 
Feedback 
(n = 13) 
Proportion of Positive Traits Listed      
M .60 .49  .68 .58 
SD .14 .12  .19 .20 
      
Number of Positive Traits Listed      
M 8.18 5.67  10.0 9.30 
SD 2.56 2.13  5.11 4.17 
      
Number of Negative Traits Listed      
M 5.82 5.53  4.17 5.46 





Response Tendencies: Mean Number of self versus nonself selections across conditions (Experiment 2 & 3)  
Experiment 2 







Condition M SD M SD  M SD M SD  M SD M SD 
Negative 
Feedback 
35.39 3.72 34.0 5.69  36.0 3.68 33.10 5.88  36.0 3.33 33.47 7.16 
               
No feedback 36.25 3.43 33.95 7.06  36.78 3.32 33.56 5.76  36.13 3.47 32.0 6.92 
               
Experiment 3 









Condition M SD M SD  M SD M SD  M SD M SD 
Negative 
Feedback 
36.31 3.67 33.22 7.25  34.55 6.24 31.75 7.14  35.71 3.91 32.62 5.12 
               
No feedback 35.0 4.80 32.29 5.14  34.30 5.26 35.55 4.26  35.40 4.42 32.85 3.91 





Means of Reaction Time to Positive and Negative Self-concepts across conditions (Experiment 2) 
 Humble  Neutral  LSE 
 Negative 
Feedback 
(n = 31) 
No 
Feedback 





(n = 31) 
No 
Feedback 
(n = 27) 
 Negative 
Feedback 
(n = 32) 
No 
Feedback 
(n = 31) 
 Positive Self-concepts 
Reaction Time (milliseconds)         
M 931.1 1026.2  836.1 1014.4  1201.8 1067.6 
SD 166.4 125.8  132.7 160.4  223.6 147.6 
         
 Negative Self-concepts 
Reaction Time (milliseconds)         
M 1005.7 1078.2  1210.1 1090.5  867.4 963.5 






Means of Reaction Time to Positive and Negative Self-concepts across conditions (Experiment 3) 
 Humble  Neutral  HSE 
 Negative 
Feedback 
(n = 22) 
No 
Feedback 
(n = 24) 
 Negative 
Feedback 
(n = 20) 
No 
Feedback 
(n = 20) 
 Negative 
Feedback 
(n = 21) 
No 
Feedback 
(n = 20) 
 Positive Self-concepts 
Reaction Time (milliseconds)         
M 908.7 1070.1  799.5 994.2  910.0 1043.6 
SD 71.6 166.5  112.1 151.36  154.3 198.3 
         
 Negative Self-concepts 
Reaction Time (milliseconds)         
M 927.9 1032.5  1184.9 1028.4  1163.4 1000.7 
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